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It  is a great  Pleasure  for  rre  to  be  here  this  evening 
to  speak  for a few  minutes  on  the  European  Cannni tY  and  its 
relations  with  the  United States. 
I do  so~ proPitiouslY  enough~  on  the  eve of  unprecedented 
face-to-face  meetings  in  Brussels - tomorrow  and  Saturday -
beu~een four  Cobinet  members  of  the  U.S.  Administration  and 
the  Executive  Commission  of  the  E.C.  under  its President  Gaston 
Thorn.  These  rreetings  wi II  cover a broad  range  of  issues. 
They  illustrate the belief on  the  part of both  the  United 
States  and  Europe  that a dialogue  must  be  continued  and 
eXPanded  on  the  problems  that  divide  us  and  which  ~LSt be 
addressed  frankly  and  conscientiously. 
Indeed~  the  world-wire  economic  crisis and  tile  terptation 
for  protectionism which  we  see  in all our  countries~  makes  it 
extremely  necessary  that  the  two  most  important  partners  of 
the  world  trading  system rmintain  their close  relations  in 
order  to 
and 
- keep  specific divergencies  under  control 
- avoid  any  over spill  into other areas  of  Euro-
AnErican  relations. 
I hope  you  will  indulge  me  if I speak  for a moment  on 
what  I believe  is  the  important  role  the  E.C.  plays  on  the - 2 -
plays  on  the Atla1tic  and  world  economic  scenes  today. 
The  ten  nations  that  rmke  up  the  European  Ccmnuni ties 
have  a corrbined  papulation  of 270  million  and a corrbined 
Gross  Domestic  Product  of$ 2.7 trillion.  The  institutions 
and  POlicies  of  the  Carmuni ty are  the  products  of  forces  which 
emerged  following  the  end  of  World  War  II 
and 
- the  desire  to avert  war 
- the  desire  to  in-prove  the  living  and  working 
conditions  of  the  people  of Europe. 
The  process  of trade  liberalization~  industrial 
develoPTEnt  and  economic  integrationJ  which  underlies  the 
E.C.J  has  brought  prosperitY  and  growth  to  the  nations  of 
Europe. 
At  the  same  timeJ  the consolidation of  ten  national 
economies  and  rmrkets  has  created  the world's  largest single 
trading  block  and  bred a POWerful  competitor for  the  United 
States.  Tnroum  the  E.Cu  European  nations  have  been  able 
to  coordinate a variety of aid  schffies  with  the Third  ~·Jorl d 
thereby  securing essential  relationships  vii th  developing 
nations.  (This  is  something  vJhich  has  to  be  taken  into account 
if one  speaks  of  burden  sharing.) - 3-
Finally.,  through  the  flec.Plinq  systffl of  European 
Political  Cooperation.,  the  E.C.  has  establishej  the 
beginnings  of a truly  "European"  foreign  POl icy.,  with 
corrrrnn  POlicies  on 
and 
-the  Helsinki  Conference  on  SecuritY  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe 
-the  ~Hoole East 
-Poland 
-Afghanistan 
-Iran. 
European  participation  in  the  Sinai  peacekeeping  force 
is  the  product  in  part  of this  growing  process  of 
hannonization  of  foreign  POlicies. 
The  staggering  economic  grov-Jth  in  Western  Europe  over 
the  past  thirty-five years.,  which  coincided with  the  evolution 
of  European  institutions.,  ~has also  inevitablY  produced 
opportunities  for  friction  vJi th  the  United States.  This 
friction  has  at  times  been  bitter.,  but  we  can  safelY  say., 
never  of a tenninal  nature. 
The  ulti~ote irony.,  perhaps.,  of  the  U.S.-E.C.  relation-
ship  is  that  in  the  1960s  and  1970s.,  as  the  European  . 
CommunitY  grew  and  gained  more  authoritY  and  legitinucy  i~ - 4 -
ana  legitinney  in  economic  nnttersJ  the  United  States 
reaffi nred  SuPPOrt  for  the  goals  and  ideals  of  the 
E.C.J  while at  the  same  time  continously  being  confronted 
with  sametines  irritating consequences  of  European  policiesJ 
whether  they  be 
11chicken  wars//  or 
11Steel  crises
11
• 
Let  rre  cite sorrething  which  an  J'1rrerican  observer wrote 
in  the  early  1960s: 
...  The  assumption  that a United  Europe  and  the 
United States  would  inevitably  conduct  parallel  POlicies 
md  have  simi lor  views  about  appropriate  tactics  runs 
comter  to historical  eXPerience.  A separate  identity  t1as 
usuallY  been  estalbished  by  opposition  to a dominant  power: 
... a united  Europe  is  likely  to  insist  on  a 
specificallY  European  view  of world  affairs - which  is 
mother way  of  saving  that  it will  challenge  American 
hegemony  in  Atlantic  POlicy.  This  may  well  be a price worth 
paying  for  European  unitY;' but  Arrerican  oolicy  has  suffered, 
from  an  unwillingness  to  recognize  that  there  is a price  to 
be  paid. 
That  was  v-tri tten  bY  a young  Harvard  professorJ  a certain 
Henry  Kissinger. - 5-
certain  Henry  Kissinger. 
Tne  continuing  ~vorld economic  crisis creates  an 
aUTosphere  in  both  Europe  and  the  United  States  of  gloom 
and  pessimism. 
Tne  depth  of the crisis  vJe  are all  facing  cannot  be 
overstated.  Unemployment  in  the  E.C.  <as  of  October  1981) 
is 9.7  million~  or 8.8% of  the  total  civilian  labour  force. 
In  the  United  States~ 8 million  are  currentlY  unemployed~ 
or  8.4% of  the  total  civilian  labour  force. 
In  both  Europe  and  the  United  States~ young  people  under 
the  age  of  25  comprise  over  40%  of  the  unemployed.  Economic 
growth  over  ttle  past  three  years  has  been  less  than  27o  on  both 
sides  of  the Atlantic. 
Such  econanic  conditions  cannot  but  bring  about  certain 
repercussions  within  the societies  in  which  they  are  develop-
ing.  Protectionism of darestic  econanies  is a pressure  that 
operates  when  difficult  economic  conditions  arise. 
The  helplessness  and  frustration  that  growing  elarents  of 
tl1e  population  feel  about  tt1ei r present  status  and  their 
future  fuel  social  attitudes  that  risk dividing  the  Western 
world.  An  emerging  inward-looking  mentalitY  can  in  some  way - 6 -
in  saTe  \~oY be  interpreted - it seffiS  to  rre  - as  an 
unoerlYing  force  in  the  resurgence  of pacifist and -
in  very  1  irni ted areas  - anti -ttrerican  sentin-ent  crrong  rmny 
Europeans.,  particularly  the  youth.  At  tr1e  sare  tirre.,  in 
the  United  States.,  the  rise of  such  a mentality  could  lead 
to a gradual  return  to  isolationism. 
I would  hope  that  neither trend will  prevail  and  that 
we  can  cooperate  to  reverse  them. 
In  these  times  of  lingering  economic  dislocation., 
rising  unemployment.,  high  inflation.,  and  excessive 
interest  rates.,  it appears  to  many  that  U.S.-E.C.  relations 
are at  their sourest  ever.,  and.,  that  indeed.,  some 
observers  believe.,  the  E.C.  itself has  gone  sour. 
I cannot  but  categoricallY  disagree  wi tl1  such  naysaying., 
and  I hope  that?8~ also - or will  - when  I have  finished 
speaking, 
The  European  nations  have  always  been  trading  nations., 
and  their aependence  on  trade  is  not  new.  Tne  developrrent  of 
our cultures  and  social  systaiE  would  not  have  been  possible 
without  extensive  and  diverse  corrrrercial  exchanges  ~;~i th  other 
European  nations  and  the  rest  of  the  v~orld.  In  19&1.,  inports - 7-
In  19ffi.,  irroorts  and  eXPorts  fra-n  and  to  third comtries., 
constituted  25%  of the  E.C.'s  Gross  Domestic  Product. 
We  are  told  in  Europe  that  ~nerica has  based  its 
rise  to  economic  suoenoawerdom  on  the  same  principle of 
free  trade.  The  new  ~rerican Actninistration  in  \•!ashington 
is  perceived as  a "free-trace" advocate  and  indeed.,  in  its 
own  words.,  has  reaffinmed  the  United States'  commi~ent 
to  that  principle. 
With  this  ~lowledge and  the  comJon  belief  in  economic 
liberalism.,  I am  confident  that  the  European  CommunitY  and 
the  United  States  can  tackle  tile  mrrerous  and  carp lex  trade 
issues  ttlat  cause  friction. 
U.S.  trade  representative  r~illic:rn Brock.,  in  his 
confi nmtion  hearings  earlier ttl is  year.,  referred  to  the 
E.C.  as  "rrajor friendlY  conpetitors  with  shared political 
values."  Over  the  past  thirtY-five  years.,  transatlantic 
trade  has  grown  irrrrensely.,  nDI<ing  our  econm1ies  !Tore  inter-
dependent  than  ever.  Econanic  develoorents  in  the  United 
States  have  severe effects  in  Europe  and  vice-versa. 
Econanic  recovery  in  t.urope  and  the  United States will  be - 8-
States will  be  mutual  and  complementary.  The  United 
States  and  the  E.C.  are  each  other's major  customer~ 
and  depend  on  each  other  to  restore  economic  growth  in 
the  industrialized world. 
According  to  the  u.s.  Commerce  DePOrtment's 
statistics~ in  1980~  U.S.  eXPorts  to  the  E.C.  were  valued 
at  $53.7 billion while  i~~Ports~E.C. were  $35.1 
bi 11 ion~  resulting  in  a trade  suml us  of  $17.5  bi 11 ion  for 
the  unted States  <of  which  6.6 billion accounts  for 
agricultural  trade alone).  This  represents  a dm.bl ing  of 
the  ceficit over  1979.  BY  way  of  corrparison~ the  u.s. 
trade deficit with  Japan  in  1980  was  around  $10  billion. 
The  reason  for  this  sharply  increased deficit  is  a 
continuation  of soaring  irroorts  of  u.s.  industrial  goods 
and  declining  E.C.  eXPorts  to  the  United States.  The  rate 
at  which  the deficit  has  increased- as  you  can  irmgine-
is  of great  concem  to  the  E. c.  rrerrber  nations  and  their 
representatives  in  Brussels. 
Although  the  rise  in  the  value  of  the  dollar  in  1981 
wi 11  probably  half  the deficit this  year~ this  continuing 
imbalance  in  U.S.-E.C.  trade~ along  with  persisting  high -------------------
- 9 -
with  persisting  high  interest  ratesJ  exacerbates 
disagreements  in  certain  economic  sectors.  The 
persistence of  the  recession  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic also  creates  an  u~fortunate ambiance  in  which 
protectionist  pressures  can  thrive. 
In  addi tionJ  between  Septffiber  19ffi  and  Septemer 
1981J  and  due  to  the  high  interest  rates  hereJ  the  dollar 
appreciated  opproxirmtely  3.T~ against  the  rmjor  European 
currencies.  Tne  dollar appreciationJ  and  rising  interest 
ratesJ  have  driven  irrport  prices  and  inflation  UP\A.JardsJ 
aggravated overall  E.C.  balance  of  payments  deficitJ  and 
mode  it more  difficult for  European  cou1tries  to  service 
their debt.  The  increase  in  the  value of  the  dollar  in 
1981  and  the  fact  that  our oil  bill  has  to  be  payed  in 
dollarsJ  caused a 'third oil  shock'  for  Europe. 
Thus  farJ  it seen~ that  protectionist  tendencies 
have  been  successfullY  resisted  on  both  sides.  The  ~listory 
of our cmnercial  relationship demnstrates  that  overall 
many  of  the  points at  issue  between  us  in  our  trade  relations 
can  be  resolved  by  patient  diplomacy  and  negotiations. - 10-
diplanacy  and  negotiations. 
As  a matter of  fact~ the  last  decade  was  very 
successful  in  achieving  progress  towards  further 
liberalization  of world  trade. 
The  E.C.  represented  the  then-nine member-states 
in  the  GATT  trade  negotiations~  agreeing  on  cor.mon 
POSitions  and  negotiating  as  a unified  bloc. 
With  thehelp of  the  mechanisms  that  \~ere created 
by  the  fJiul ti lateral  Trade  i~egotiations  U'Tfi'n  - the  Tokyo 
Round- in  1979~ the  E.C.  Conmission  has  been  responsible 
for  defusing  pressures  from  European  business  groUPs~ unions 
and  even  national  govemrents  to  reverse  the  steps  that 
were  so  painstakingly  taken  to  liberalize  trade over  the 
past  generation. 
Tnese  pressures  persist  nevertheless  and  threaten  the 
integrity of  ttle  1~orld trading  systEm.  In  a period of 
soaring  unaiployn-enL  hi9l  inflation~ and  low  growth~ it 
would  not  take  much  to  trigger a trade  war.  If one  trade -ll-
If one  trade  dispute  which  appears  relatively 
uninportant  or  narrowly  focused  is  allowed  to  get 
out  of  hand~  it is  likely  to  lead  to  more  bitter 
disputes~ with  protectionist  POlicies  POssibly 
spreading  like wildfire. 
This  "Catch  22"  situation - in  which  trm.iJled 
economic  tines  increase  the  likelihood of  trade 
protectionism at a tinE  when  precisely  the  contrary  -
increased  trade - is a necessary  prescriPtion  for  economic 
recovery- is  not  easilY  resolvable. 
In  light  of  the difficult econanic  conditions  in  the 
member  nations  of  the  E.C.~  several  trade  issues  have  assumed 
great  ir~ortant in  United  States-E.C.  relations.  TI1ose  of  us 
who  favour  the  survival  and  exoansion  of free  trade will  have 
to  pay  attention  to  these  issues.  Allow  me  to  cite some  of 
then: 
STEEL 
As  you  know~  the  steel  issue  is~  at  this  nrnent~  the 
greatest single  irritant  in  U.s. -E. C.  industrial  relations. 
1981  has  been  a difficult year  in  this  regard.  The  u.s. 
Governrent  has  itself recently  initiated several  cases  to 
investigate steel  inoorts  to  the  United  States. - 12-
the  United States. 
We  in  Europe  accept  in  principle  that  the Trigger 
Price  Mechanism  (TPf·il)  is,  with  all  its defects,  sti  11  the 
best solution  to  deal  with  the  problan.  However,  v1e  also 
feel  that  it must  be  construed  and  applied  in  such  a way 
as  to  take  into  account  the  realities of  the nurket  place. 
The  United States  and  the  E.C.  have  been  engaged  in 
a long  dialogue  on  steel  eXPorts,  but  no  resolution  to  the 
problem  has  emerged. 
E.C.  eXPorts  have  fluctuated  over  the  POSt  five  years  -
1977  1978  1979  19@ 
6.8 million  tons  7.5 million  t.  5.4 million  t.  3.9 million  tons 
The  6 million  tons  eXPected  to  be  exPorted  in  1981  have  been  due  to 
the  surge  in  demand  for  energy-related  items  such  as  pipe  and  tube. 
Excepting  pipe  and  tube,  E.C.  penetration of  the  U.S.  steel  nurket 
has  dropped  from  6.7%  in  1977  to  4.5%  in  1981. 
r-'lore  protection  of  the  steel  industry  would  be  costlY  to 
the  American  consumer,  and  would  not  solve  tts structural 
problems. - 13-
its structural  problems. 
AGRICULTuRAL  TRADE 
Both  the  United  States  and  the  EC  are  major exoorters 
of agricultural  products.  At  the  sanE  time~ the  t.C.  is 
the  United States/  nnst  important  client  for  agricultural 
goods~  buYing  nearly  $9  billion annuallY  from  the  U.S. 
Our  differences  with  the  United  States  in  the 
agricultural  trade area  revolve  around  E.C.  PDlicies  on 
agricultural  exoorts  and  imports  and  on  the  application 
of  the  Subsidy  Code~  established during  the  Tokyo  Round 
of multilateral  trade  negotiations.  The  Code  sets  rules 
on  exoort  subsidies  for agricultural  products. 
AltholJ;lh  every  country  with  rn:U or agricultural  production~ 
including  the  United  States~ has  fann  SUPPOrt  progranrres~ 
with  mechanis~s to  regulate  imports  and  favour  exoorts~ the 
E.C.  has  been  frequentlY  criticized  by  its  An~rican 
carpeti tor for  the  rrechanisrns  it has  in  place. 
The  u.s.  Governrrent  has  recentlY  initiated several  forrml 
complaints  against  the  E.C.  on  - among  others  -
wheat  flour - 14-
- wheat  flour 
-sugar 
-paultry. 
This  has  been  surprising  to  us  because  the  E.C.  hod  agreed 
to  the  Code  in  exa1ange  for  the  general  recognition  of  its 
agricultural  policy  and  because  it has  closley  respected  the 
Code's  obligations  since  its  inception  on  January  1st.,  1900. 
The  main  U.S.  argument  is  based  on  a different  interpretation 
of  the  Code  (representative  reference  period  on  the  basis  of 
which  equitable market  shares  ore  detennined). 
BY  the  way  in  the  case  of  sugar~ E.C.  funding  no  longer 
exists  and  producers  must  bear  the entire  costs  of surplus 
disposal.  This  at a tirre  when  the  United States  is  preparing 
to  raise  its own  sugar  SuPPOrts. 
The  major  objective~ at  present~ is  to  try  and  resolve 
these  disputes  within  U1e  settlerent procedures  provided  by 
the  Subsidy  Code.  Afterwards~ we  hope  that  further  disputes 
can  be  avoided  in  the  interest of  both  sides.  Otherv~ise~ 
sucn  disputes  could spill  over  into other areas.  This  would 
damage  our overall  bilateral  relationship.  In  the  difficult 
tirres  we  ore  eXPeriencing  at  present~  \~e cannot  afford 
another  "chicken  \tJor". - 15-
another  "chicken  war". 
I would  like  to  add  that  the  E.C.  is  v~orking hard  to 
reforTil  its Camnn  Agricultural  PolicY.,  ~'Jtlich.,  if successfuL 
would  render  any  furtber  discussions  unde~ .the  Code 
unnecessary.  We  would  hope.,  for  exarole.,  to  bring  our 
cereal  suoport  prices  down  to  the  U.~. price  SuPPOrt  level 
wi tl1in  the  next  few  years. 
There  are  ITainlY  two  reasons  for  this  reform  pol icy: 
- the  Community  is  approaching  the  ceiling  of 
its tax  powers  (a  value  added  tax of  - a 
rmxi m.rn  - 1.1~) 
- Tne  agricultural  population  in  our  ~lerrber 
States  twenty  years  was  rrnre  than  20  mi 11 ion. 
It has  now  dropped  to  8 million.  At  the  sen~ 
tirre.,  the  uneroloynent  figure  rose  fran 2 to 
nearly  10  million.  Therefore.,  public  OPinion 
in  all  our  Marber States  understands  the  need 
for  changes  in  our exoensive  CAP. 
TEXTILES 
The  past  t'Ho  years  hove  Hi tnessed o sharo  increase 
in  textile  imPorts  from  the  United States  into  the  E.C. 
l11is  is a slbject of  growing  friction  between  the  United - 16-
between  the  United  States  and  the  E.C.  in  large part 
because  of  Europe's  ailing textile industry,  which  has 
suffered  frCTtl  increased  inports  fran  low-cost  countries 
in  recent  years. 
In  1979,  for excrnole,  the  E.C.  imported  textile ana 
clothing  products  in  tl1e  mount  of $11.5 filillion  fran  low-
cost  sources,  'i-Jhile  the  United  States  irroorted  $5.4millions 
wortil.  Irroort  penetration  for  the  E. c.  (1980)  is  44/~ and  for  the 
united  States  12.4%  (1979)  on  a quantitY  basis. 
For  these  reasons,  and  because  the  E.C.  is  much  rrore 
eXPosed  to  pressure  fran  low-cost  textile and  clothing  inports, 
the  E. C.  be 1  i  eves  that  the  three  rmj or  rm rkets  for  text i I  e 
products  - the  E.C.,  the  United  States,  and  Japa1  - should 
share  the  burden  of  low-cost  textile eXPorts  equallY. 
EXPORT  CREDITS 
In  [OnY  countries,  a situation has  arisen  in  which  export 
creidts have  become  heavilY  subsidized.  This  has  been  a 
continuing  sore  POint.  However,  following  talks  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Organization  for  Econanic  Cooperation  and 
Leveloprent  <OECm,  as  well  as  the  realization of  the  exorbitant - 17-
of  the  exorbitant  costs  of exPort  creditsJ  a nnre 
POSitive  atlmsohere  and  a consensus  anong  JapanJ  the  E.C. 
and  the  United States  has  ererged.  An  agreeTent  has 
recentlY  been  worked  out  on  the  principle of  raising  minirml 
interest  rates.  The  present  agreement  is  very  important 
sinceJ  without  a consensusJ  the  industrialized countries  would 
risk  being  involved  in  a "war  of credits". 
Before  concluding  my  remarks  this  eveningJ  I would  be 
remiss  if I did  not  address  another  trade  issue  which  is  of 
'sare'  irrportance  to  both  tt1e  United  States  and  the  rTffiber 
nations  of  the  E.C. 
Tr1e  question  of  how  to  conduct  East-West  trade  is also 
a wajor  issue  in  U.S.-E.C.  relations. 
Trade with  the Soviet  Union  and  its East  European  neighboursJ 
as  ~~ell  as  with  ChinaJ  is  a current  source  of strain  between 
the  United  States  and  its  ~~estern European  allies.  Europe  has  a 
rapidly  rising  trade  with  the  Eastern  Bloc  whichJ  if barred  or 
drastically cut  bact<,  ~Jould have  severe  econanic  consequences. 
Reducing  trade  wi til  the  East  could  also  possiblY  undennine 
\Aihatever  political  and  social  inroads  had  been  rrode  bY  tr1e  people ------~-----·------------------
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by  the  people  of  Eastern  Europe  as  a result  of  increased 
ccmrercial  relations  \"'i ttl  tl1e  West. 
The  United States  has  eXPressed  concern  on  the 
conclusion  of  the  agreff,Ent  between  the  Soviet  Union  and 
several  European  states  regarding  tile  proposed  NorthvJest 
Siberian pipeline.  For  us)  this  project  is  to  be  seen  as 
part  of  our  energy  diversification  progranre  ~~hich vii 11 
reduce  the  percentage  of oil  in  our energy  i~tPorts and 
increase  the  number  of  our  SuPPliers. 
Incidentally)  the  hard  currency  whictl  the  USSR  wi 11 
receive  from  us  for  its gas)  will  enable  it to  buy  the 
enornous  quanti ties of  grain  whicll  the  United  States  hOPe 
to  sell  to  the  USSR  in  the  future. 
The  challenges  in  the  1980s  to  ensure  as  open  an 
international  trading  system as  possible  are  immense. 
Reconciling  the  needs  of particular darestic  industrial 
and  agricultural  sectors  \"'i th  the  requi rerents  of a free 
trade  system  is  not  an  easy  thing  to  do  for  the  U.S. 
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or  turopean  goverrroents. 
But  ~vhi le  we  are  caroeti tors.,  we  are also  partners. 
Experience  has  shown  that  Europe  and  America  can  resolve 
trade  disputes.~ because  each  is  carmi tted  to  r1Tiintaining 
an  open  world  econrrnv  and  the  very  close  'hotline'  relationshiP 
that exists  ben~een trade officials  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic.  Of  course.,  each  of  us  Hill  seek  to  defen  his 
interests  as  effectively as  he  can.,  but  - because  of our 
common  political  and  economic  values  and  our  mutual  interest 
in  ensuring  prosperity  for  our  people  - v.1e  have  negotiated 
in  good  faith  and  - I sincerely  believe - will  continue  to 
do  so. 
w11i le  Europe  and  Ari-erica  rmy  have  alrmst  continuous  -
it seems  - disagreements  on  haw  to  deal  with  many  issues., 
there are  enough  common  beliefs  among  us  to  make  us  able 
to  sunnount  whatever  our  differences  may  be  by  identifying 
what  brings  us  together  rather  tilan  by  errohasizing  what 
makes  us  differ  from  one  another. 
In  a tirre  when  economic  tunmi 1 and  political  change 
test  our will  and  When  carman  challenges  confront  us.,  there ~~  -----~~------~-----------
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confront  usJ  there  is a critical  need  for  the  United  States 
and  its European  friends  and  allies to  rise  above  parochial 
concerns  and  to  strengtt1en  the Atlantic  PartnerslliP  vJhich 
still is  the  most  brilliant achievement  of  American  post-
war  diplcnocy I 
TormrrCJv.JJ  in  BrusselsJ  the  leaders  of  the  United States 
and  of  the  European  Carmuni ty will  rena-1  this  pledge I 